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DIRECTORS' BUSINESS JUDGMENT IN TERMINATING DERIVATIVE
SUITS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981)
The Delaware Supreme Court in Zapata Corp. v. MaldonadoI clari-
fied Delaware law2 by holding that a committee of disinterested direc-
tors may terminate a properly initiated3 derivative suit4 only when the
trial court, using its independent business judgment, deems termination
of the suit proper.
In 1975, plaintiff William Maldonado, alleging breach of fiduciary
duty,5 instituted a stockholder's derivative suit on behalf of Zapata
1. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
2. See Hinsey, Maldonado (NY) v. Maldonado (DE). Which Prevails?, Legal Times Wash.,
Aug. 4, 1980, at 18; Note, Corporations-The Stockholder'r Independent Right to Sue Derivativelly-
Maldonado v. Flynn and Its Progeny, 29 KAN. L. REv. 135 (1980). Compare Maldonado v.
Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) with Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch.
1980), ree'd, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
3. See note 80 infra.
4. See W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5939 (rev.
perm. ed. 1980). Fletcher defines a derivative suit in the following manner.
In legal effect, a stockholder's suit is one by the corporation conducted by the stock-
holder as its representative. The stockholder is only a nominal plaintiff, the corporation
being the real party in interest.
The suit is a derivative one, and is to be distinguished from a representative action
brought by a stockholder as an individual and for his own benefit in behalf of himself
and other stockholders similarly situated. Where plaintiff does not seek to enforce relief
for the benefit of the corporation, it is not derivative and not a stockholder's suit.
Id at 359. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 452-53 (1881) (the nature of a derivative suit is
twofold: first, a suit to compel the corporation to sue; second, the suit by the corporation); Maldo-
nado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980) (stockholder recourse when dissatisfied with
the decision of directors concerning the corporation is a derivative suit, which is an action derived
from the corporation); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 218 (Del. Ch. 1974) (the purpose of a
derivative action is to enable the stockholder to sue in the corporation's name, given refusal by
those in control of the corporation to assert the corporations' rights), afd in part and rev'd in par,
347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975). See general
, 
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1974) (authorizes the use of
the derivative suit by a stockholder of the corporation); W. FLETCHER, supra, §§ 5939-5985.1 (dis-
cusses shareholders' derivative suit). See also Foss v. Harbottle, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch. 1843) (case
that is often recognized as the first shareholders' derivative suit).
5. The directors of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the stockholders. See Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 43 (3d Cir. 1947) (under state decisions, the directors owe a duty
of managing corporate affairs honestly and impartially on behalf of the corporation and all the
stockholders); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 364 (D. Del. 1975) (fiduciary duty is borne
by the directors); Harriman v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101, 106 (D. Del.
1974) (under Delaware law, when a person affirmatively undertakes to dictate the destiny of a
corporation, he assumes a fiduciary duty to the corporation and the stockholders); Petty v.
Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975) (directors of a corporation stand in a
position of trustee to the stockholders); Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653, 658
1425
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Corporation against ten of the corporation's directors.' In 1979,
Zapata's board of directors7 created an Independent Investigation
Committee' to determine9 whether the corporation should proceed
with the litigation.'" The Committee recommended that the Corpora-
tion seek dismissal of this and the other related suits. " Zapata moved
alternatively for dismissal or summary judgment.' 2 The Delaware
Court of Chancery denied both of the corporation's motions.' 3 On
(Del. Ch. 1975) (corporate directors stand in a fiduciary relationship to their corporation and its
shareholders, and their primary duty is to deal fairly and justly with both), appeal dismissed, 365
A.2d 136 (Del. 1976); Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974) (same); Gott-
lieb v. McKee, 107 A.2d 240, 243 (Del. Ch. 1954) (same); Lofiand v. Cahall, 13 Del. Ch. 384, 118
A. 1, 3 (1922) (same).
In Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), plaintiff alleged that the directors accel-
erated the exercise date of a stock option plan for the purpose of decreasing their federal income
tax liability, thereby depriving the corporation of a federal tax deduction of a comparable amount.
Id at 1254-55.
6. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980).
7. Four of the defendant-directors no longer held board positions by the time of this trial.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. Ch. 1981).
8. The committee was composed of two newly appointed directors, who were allegedly in-
dependent of management. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980).
Most state corporate statutes permit the board of directors of a corporation to select a committee
of directors to act with the authority of the entire board. See, e.g., Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-
042 (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-9 (West Supp. 1981).
9. "The Committee's determination was stated to be 'final. . .not ... subject to review by
the Board of Directors and. . . in all respects ... binding upon the corporation.'" Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del, 1981).
10. The committee was additionally authorized to determine whether the corporation should
litigate two companion actions: Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (alle-
gation of breach of fiduciary duty subsequent to breach alleged in Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d
1251 (Del. Ch. 1980)), and Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (federal claim
arising out of same facts as Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980)).
11. See Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Maldonado v. Flynn,
485 F. Supp. 274, 277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch.
1980). The Committee recommended dismissal of all pending suits for the following reasons:
(1) the asserted claims appeared to be without merit; (2) costs of litigation, exacerbated
by likelihood of indemnification; (3) wasted senior management time and talents on pur-
suing litigation; (4) damage to company from publicity; (5) that no material injury ap-
peared to have been done to company; (6) impairment of current director-defendants'
ability to manage; (7) the slight possibility of recurrence of violations; (8) lack of per-
sonal benefit to current director-defendants from alleged conduct; (9) that certain alleged
practices were continuing business practices, intended to be in company's best interests;
(10) legal question whether the complaints stated a cause of action; (11) fear of under-
mining employee morale; (12) adverse effects of the company's relations with employees
and suppliers and customers.
485 F. Supp. at 284 n.35.
12. Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485
F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980).
13. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980). "The directors cannot compel the
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interlocutory appeal,1 4 the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed, re-
manded, and held: The Court of Chancery should apply its own busi-
ness judgment in determining whether a committee consisting of
disinterested directors can terminate a properly initiated stockholder's
derivative suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty by certain directors. 15
The business judgment rule insulates corporate directors from per-
sonal liability for good faith business decisions. 16  Courts ordinarily
exercise extreme deference when reviewing the propriety of directors'
dismissal of a pending stockholder's suit which seeks redress for an apparent breach of fiduciary
duty, by merely reviewing the suit and making a business judgment that it is not in the best
interests of the corporation." Id. at 1257. Accord, Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.
Tex. 1980) (alternative motions were denied by the court). Contra, Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F.
Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (motion for dismissal was granted).
14. Following acceptance of the interlocutory appeal by the Delaware Supreme Court, the
Court of Chancery dismissed Maldonado's cause of action. Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378
(Del. Ch. 1980). The court's dismissal, based on the theory of res judicata, was expressly condi-
tioned upon the Second Circuit affirming the earlier New York District Court decision. Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981). The Second Circuit appeal was ordered
stayed pending resolution by the Delaware Supreme Court of the Court of Chancery's order deny-
ing dismissal and summary judgment. Id.
15. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981).
16. See Cramer v. GTE Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978) (absent bad faith or some
other corrupt motive, directors are normally not liable to the corporation for mistakes of judg-
ment), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 352 (Del.
Ch. 1972) (directors are accorded presumption of having acted in good faith and in interests of
stockholders); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (decision of a corporate
director may come within the business judgment rule); Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 71 (Del. Ch.
1969) (directors are not liable for good faith errors, absent fraud), aft'd, 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1970);
Prince v. Bensinger, 244 A.2d 89, 94 (Del. Ch. 1968) (directors not liable for mere good faith errors
in judgment); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 124, 100 N.E. 721, 724 (1912) (same).
The business judgment rule has been defined:
A corporate transaction that involves no self-dealing by, or other personal interest of,
the directors who authorized the transaction will not be enjoined or set aside for the
directors' failure to satisfy the standards that govern a director's performance of his or
her duties, and directors who authorized the transaction will not be held personally lia-
ble for resultant damages, unless [the trier of fact determines]: (1) the directors did not
exercise due care to ascertain the relevant and available facts before voting to authorize
the transaction; or (2) the directors voted to authorize the transaction even though they
did not reasonably believe or could not have reasonably believed the transaction to be
for the best interest of the corporation; or (3) in some other way the directors' authoriza-
tion... was not in good faith.
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFSTR.A L. REV. 93, 111-12 (1979). See generally
Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Liigatimr The Death of the Derivative
Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96 (1980); Johnson & Osborne, The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in
a Litigious Society, 15 VAL. U.L. Rav. 49 (1980); Lewis, The Business Judgment Rule and Corpo-
rate Directors' Liabilityfor Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 157 (1970); Stegemoeller, Deriva-
tive Actions and the Business Judgment Rule" Directorial Power to Compel Dismissal, 69 ILL. B.J.
338 (1981).
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business judgments. 7 Historically, directors have relied on the busi-
ness judgment rationale in dismissing shareholder derivative suits that
they in good faith deem inimical to the corporation's best interests.'
The decision to litigate is within the broad class of decisions gener-
ally left to the directors' discretion.' 9 Statutory and case law promote
this policy by requiring the shareholder to make demand upon the di-
rectors,2 ° unless such demand would be futile.2 ' Courts, however, have
long recognized that a corporation does not possess unlimited power to
dismiss a derivative suit simply by claiming the exercise of business
judgment.2 2 In Hawes v. Oakland,' the Supreme Court declared that
17. See Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) (under sound business judgment
rule, courts will not intervene in corporate decision making if the judgment of the directors is
made in good faith and is uninfluenced by personal considerations); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (decisions of board of directors will not be disturbed by the court if
the decision can be attributed to any rational business judgment); Mercantile Trading Co. v. Ro-
senbaum Grain Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 325, 334-35, 154 A. 457, 461 (1931) (fraud or other ultra vires
misconduct must be shown to justify interference by the court in matters of business judgment).
See generally Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL
L. REv. 600 (1980).
18. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917) (directors
may dismiss derivative suits properly brought, and courts will not interfere with such a decision
except when directors are guilty of bad faith); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187
U.S. 455 (1903) (upholding the idea that directors of a corporation exercising their business judg-
ment may terminate derivative litigation); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881) (directors may
dismiss derivative suits, and the business judgment rule insulates the decision when no fraud or
bad faith is alleged). See general Foss v. Harbottle, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch. 1843) (case that is
often recognized as the first derivative suit). See also Stegemoeller, supra note 16.
19. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917); Mal-
donado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Gail v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508,
514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Dent, supra note 16, at 98.
20. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450,451 (1881); Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 441,
141 A. 277, 281 (1927); Fleer v. Fleer Corp., 14 Del. Ch. 277, 283, 125 A. 411, 414 (1924); FED. R.
Civ. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. See generally Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a
Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1960); Note, The Demand and Standing
Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 168 (1976).
In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), the shareholder did not make de-
mand on directors, and the court upheld this conduct, reasoning that demand was futile. Id. at
782. The court found that Zapata's board retained all corporate power concerning litigation deci-
sions and said that the shareholder demand requirement itself "evidence[d] that the managerial
power [was] retained by the board." Id. at 785-86. See note 22 infra.
21. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 97 (1957) (where antagonism exists between directors and
shareholders, demand is futile and therefore waived); Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579, 587
(1905) (same); de Haas v. Empire Petroleum, 286 F. Supp. 809, 813 (D. Colo. 1968), aft'd, 435 F.2d
1223 (10th Cir. 1970) (question of whether demand should be excused is generally left to the
discretion of the court). But see Siegel v. Merrick, 84 F.R.D. 106, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (presence
or even control of board by interested directors does not necessarily make demand futile).
22. See, e.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881) (shareholder may sue when direc-
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the composition of the board determines the stockholder's standing24
when the board refuses to bring the action.25
Justice Brandeis refined the business judgment rule and its relation
to the power to dismiss shareholder derivative suits in United Copper
Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co. 26 The case involved a deriv-
ative suit brought by an individual shareholder asserting an antitrust
claim against third parties. The Court held that the directors have the
discretion to terminate a derivative suit unless they are guilty of a
breach of trust or are unable to make an unprejudiced determination.27
Justice Brandeis, reiterating the rationale of Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell
Gold Mining Co. ,28 held in United Copper that the decision to pursue a
legal cause of action is one of business judgment, provided the directors
act in good faith.29
tors act fraudulently, in breach of trust, or ultra vires) (dicta). In Hawes, a shareholder brought
suit against the City of Oakland for alleged use of company assets without compensation. The
board of directors of the company decided not to pursue the suit. Id. at 451.
23. 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
24. Standing in derivative suits refers to the ability of minority stockholders to sue despite the
opposition of the board of directors or a majority of shareholders. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104
U.S. 450, 452-53 (1881); Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative
Actions, supra note 20, at 168 n.5.
25. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881). The court cited self-interest, fraud, illegal-
ity, and action beyond given authority as factors that courts should consider in determining
whether a stockholder can maintain a suit despite dismissal by the board of directors. Id.
26. 244 U.S. 261 (1916).
27. Id. at 263-64. Justice Brandeis' decision is cited by one commentator as "the seed for this
corporate governance procedure." Hinsey, supra note 2, at 18. See also Note, supra note 17. "In
applying this rule, courts have treated decisions to refrain from pursuing suits on behalf of the
corporation the same as any other business decision." Id. at 600.
28. 187 U.S. 455 (1903). Corbus stands for the proposition that directors are not obligated to
pursue all causes of action and may justifiably waive a legal right vested in the corporation on the
belief that the corporation's best interests will be secured by not litigating. The decision to termi-
nate is thus like any other decision. Id. at 463. See also Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 456-57,
460 (1881) (in general, decision whether to sue is within discretion of directors, and shareholder
cannot compel suit absent fraud, breach of trust, or ultra vires action by directors); Puma v. Marri-
ott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971) (under Delaware law, decision whether to permit a deriva-
tive suit may be made by independent directors with independent business judgment).
29. Thus, a shareholder was not permitted to intervene, as of right, in order to continue
litigation that independent members of the board of directors, acting in good faith and in the
exercise of sound business judgment, have decided to terminate. Allegheny Corp. v. Kirby, 344
F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed sub nom. Holt v. Allegheny Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966).
See also Ash v. IBM, Inc., 353 F.2d 491,492-93 (3d Cir. 1965) (minority stockholder lacked stand-
ing to maintain derivative action on behalf of the corporation, in absence of showing that refusal
of directors to sue was fraudulent, collusive, or represented anything worse than unsound business
judgment honestly exercised), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854,
859 (7th Cir. 1957) ("stockholders have no more right to challenge by a derivative suit a decision
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United Copper30 and subsequent cases3' permitted disinterested
boards to terminate derivative actions against third parties.32 The re-
quirement that the board make an unprejudiced determination, how-
ever, precluded boards from terminating actions that named a majority
of directors as defendants. 33 Gall v. Exxon Corp. 34 departed radically
from previous doctrine by extending the power to dismiss actions
against third parties to actions against directors themselves.35 In Gall,
the board, by appointing a Special Litigation Committee,36 successfully
avoided United Copper's proscription of directors determining whether
to terminate suits against their fellow directors. The board of directors
authorized the Committee, consisting of disinterested directors, to in-
vestigate the merits of the derivative action and determine whether the
corporation should pursue the litigation.37  The court held that the
not to sue than to challenge any other decision by the board"); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696,
700 (D. Del. 1966) (business judgments should not be usurped by shareholder unless board of
directors has not exercised its judgment in good faith); McKee v. Rogers, 18 Del. Ch. 81, 85-86,
156 A. 191, 193 (1931) (stockholder cannot invade discretionary field of directors and sue in cor-
poration's behalf when managing body refuses).
30. 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
31. Ash v. IBM, Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Allegheny
Corp. v. Kirby, 344 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissedsub nom. Holt v. Allegheny Corp., 384
U.S. 28 (1966); Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915
(1963); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957); Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d
731 (1960). Contra, Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 141 A. 277 (1931) (stockholder may sue in
his own name to enforce corporate rights, making the corporation nominally a party defendant, if
corporation, on demand of the stockholder, refuses to bring suit).
32. One court has held that dismissal is permitted when a majority of the board members are
not involved in the alleged fraud or breach of trust, thus implying that dismissal of a derivative
action is permitted in isolated circumstances. Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 858-59 (7th Cir.
1957).
33. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264 (1917).
34. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
35. See Note, supra note 17, at 607.
36. 418 F. Supp. at 510. A "special litigation committee" is a group of disinterested directors
authorized by the full board to determine whether to pursue a derivative action naming directors
as defendants. See generaly Dent, supra note 16; Stegemoeller, supra note 16; Note, supra note
17; Comment, Novel Application of the Business Judgment Rule: Independent Directors ,4re Permit-
ted to Terminate Derivative Actions Algainst Fellow Interested Directors, 11 CuM. L. REv. 389
(1980).
37. Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. at 510-11. The court reasoned that "[t]he focus of the
business judgment rule inquiry is on those who actually wield the decision-making authority, not
on those who might have possessed such authority at different times and under different circum-
stances." Id. at 517.
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Special Litigation Committee's decision not to sue the defendant direc-
tors constituted a proper exercise of business judgment.3 8
State law generally governs whether a special litigation committee
may terminate a derivative suit.39 In Burks v. Lasker,4 ° the Supreme
Court addressed a federal law-state law conflict in a situation involving
a special litigation committee and alleged violations of federal stat-
utes.4' Justice Brennan developed a two-tiered test to determine
whether the committee could terminate a derivative suit.42 First, the
state's corporation law must permit delegation of the board's power to
terminate derivative suits to a committee consisting of independent di-
rectors. Second, the termination of the derivative suit must be consis-
tent with the policies underlying federal law.43  The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case because the lower courts failed to de-
termine the scope of the state law.44
Subsequently, several federal courts employed Burks' two-tiered test
and allowed a special committee to terminate derivative actions.41 In
Abbey v. Control Data Corp.46 the Eighth Circuit interpreted Delaware
38. Id. at 518. The court nevertheless denied the motion for summary judgment in order to
permit plaintiff an opportunity to conduct discovery concerning the independence of the special
committee. Id. at 520.
39. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) ("Itlhe first place one must look to determine
the powers of corporate directors is in the relevant State's corporation law"); Santa Fe Indus., Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (same); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (same). See also
Note, supra note 17, at 608 (whether a special litigation committee may terminate a derivative suit
is primarily a question of state law).
40. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
41. Id. at 473. The shareholder alleged violation of the Investment Company and Invest-
ment Advisers Acts, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l, -b-I (1976).
42. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 480. No formal special litigation committee was established
in Burks. Rather, Burks involved a termination decision made by a quorum of disinterested di-
rectors. Nevertheless, the principle announced in Burks is applicable to cases in which a formal
special litigation committee has been established.
43. See id at 480, 486. See generally Note, Director Dismissal ofShareholder Derivative Suits
Under the Investment CompanyAct: Burks v. Lasker, II Loy. CHI. L.J. 519, 519-26 (1980); Com-
ment, supra note 36, at 396-407.
The decision in Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), sets the standard that all federal courts
will follow when deciding questions of a similar nature in the future. See note 47 infra.
44. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979).
45. Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying California law), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 869 (1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979) (applying Dela-
ware law), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D.
Mich. 1980) (applying Michigan law); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(applying Delaware law).
46. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
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law47 as permitting a full board to delegate its dismissal power to a
committee of disinterested directors. 48 The court found that termina-
tion of the suit did not contradict underlying federal policy49 and
granted a motion for dismissal. Adhering to precedent, 5° the court did
not investigate the reasonableness of the independent directors' deter-
mination.5 ' Such a decision fell within the domain of the business
judgment rule.52 In Maldonado v. Flynn, 3 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, relying primarily on the holding in
Abbey,54 permitted termination of a derivative suit alleging federal
47. The relevant Delaware statute that confers authority upon directors to delegate their
power is DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (c) (1975), which reads, in relevant part:
The board of directors may, by resolution passed by a majority of the whole board,
designate 1 or more committees, each committee to consist of I or more of the directors
of the corporation .... Any such committee, to the extent provided in the resolution of
the board of directors, or in the bylaws of the corporation, shall have and may exercise
the powers and authority of the board of directors in the management of the business
and affairs of the corporation, and may authorize the seal of the corporation to be affixed
to all papers which may require it ....
48. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1017 (1980). The Abbey court cited Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971) and
quoted Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 165, 160 A.2d 731, 738 (1960) for the proposition that
Delaware case law permits disinterested directors to exercise their own independent business judg-
ment and, in appropriate cases, to dismiss derivative suits. Thus the court in Puma held that
dismissal was appropriate. "[S]ince the transaction complained of was accomplished as a result of
the exercise of independent business judgment of the outside, independent directors whose sole
interest was the furtherance of the corporate enterprise, the court is precluded from substituting its
uninformed opinion for that of the experienced, independent board members. . . ." 283 A.2d at
696. The Abbey court cited Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), for the
proposition that dismissal did not constitute a ratification of an illegal act.
49. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724,730-32 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1017 (1980).
50. See notes 19 & 31 supra.
51. The business judgment rule limits the role of the court to determine whether the commit-
tee acted in good faith. It places the burden of proving impropriety on the shareholder. See
Rosengarten v. IT&T Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 824-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Puma v. Marriott, 283
A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971); Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160, 160 A.2d 731, 738-39 (1960).
Contra, Auerbach v. Bennett, 64 A.D.2d 98, 408 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1978), rev'd, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393
N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). The Appellate Division inAuerbach rejected the presump-
tion of propriety afforded by the business judgment rule and instead adopted a standard of rea-
sonableness, which permits broader judicial review into the committee's decision to terminate. It
stated that the appropriateness of the Special Committee's decision "[c]learly depends on the
depth and amplitude of the investigation and the emphasis placed by the committee on the vari-
ous factors necessarily to be considered." 64 A.D.2d at 107, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 87. See also Note,
supra note 17.
52. See notes 19 & 31 supra.
53. 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
54. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
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security violations. 5  Federal courts in California 56 and Michigan 57
reached similar results.
Although few courts have applied the Burks test to determine
whether a special committee can dismiss a derivative suit,58 nearly all
relevant federal cases interpret state law to allow termination and hold
that such termination is consistent with underlying federal policy.5 9
Contrary to federal court interpretations of Delaware law,6" the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery in Maldonado v. ]Rynn 6l held that a special
55. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. at 286.
56. Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980). The
court held that "the good faith exercise of business judgment by a special litigation committee of
disinterested directors is immune to attack by shareholders or the courts." Id at 783.
57. Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980). In permitting dismissal, the
Genzer court emphasized that the proper role of the court is limited to inquiry into the indepen-
dence of the committee. Given independence, the business judgment rule "shields the delibera-
tions and conclusions of the chosen representatives of the board." Id at 693 (quoting Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1979)).
58. It is well settled that directors properly decide whether to litigate when they act in good
faith. See notes 29 & 32 supra and accompanying text. However, the development of the special
litigation committee as a means of terminating derivative suits that the board as a whole could not
terminate is a recent phenomenon, and only a small number of reported cases have addressed this
problem. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (8th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v. GTE Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Rosen-
garten v. IT&T Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
59. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S.
1017 (1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Few state courts have ruled
on this question, as the majority of derivative suits alleging director improprieties are brought in
federal court and allege federal securities act violations. In the absence ofstate court decisions on
the authority of the special litigation committee, federal courts have had wide latitude to interpret
state law. Typically, they have permitted termination. See note 47 supra; note 61 infra. But see
Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980). Ga/ef represents an exception to what the Ninth
Circuit called a "clear trend in the law." Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980). The Second Circuit in Gale/ reversed and remanded a lower
court decision that permitted dismissal of a derivative suit upon recommendation of a special
litigation committee. The Second Circuit held that the district court had failed to consider the
effect of the state law of incorporation, as well as the federal law underlying the cause of action.
In opposition to the majority of recent federal decisions that permit disinterested directors to exer-
cise virtually unbridled discretion in deciding the fate of a derivative suit, Gale/ seems to embrace
the argument that "[t]he shareholder's right to bring a derivative action, and not the directors'
judgment regarding the best interest of the corporation, is the primary factor in reviewing a busi-
ness judgment dismissal." Comment, supra note 36, at 412-13.
60. See, ag., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1017 (1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
61. 413 A.2d 1251 (Del Ch. 1980), rey'dsub nonm Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779
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litigation committee composed of independent board members could
not dismiss certain derivative suits against fellow directors.62 The Vice
Chancellor explained that the business judgment rule does not give di-
rectors the power to dismiss such suits. 63 The court went on to assert
that in certain actions a shareholder retains an independent right to sue
derivatively, regardless of any board determination about the suit's po-
tential harm or benefit to the corporation.64
In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,65 the Delaware Supreme Court at-
tempted to strike a balance between a corporation's legitimate need to
avoid meritless litigation and a shareholder's right to check corporate
mismanagement through use of a derivative suit.6 6 The court rejected
the opposing positions of the Court of Chancery 67 and the federal
courts68 because each sacrificed the needs of either the corporation or
the shareholder for the benefit of the other. The court sought a middle
(Del. 1981). The suit alleged breach of a fiduciary trust by a majority of the directors. See note 5
supra.
62. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d at 1257. "[Dlirectors cannot compel the dismissal of a
pending stockholder's derivative suit which seeks redress for an apparent breach of fiduciary duty
by merely reviewing the suit and making a business judgment that it is not in the best interests of
the corporation." Id F/ynn provided the basis for two other district courts to disallow attempts by
disinterested directors to dismiss shareholder derivative actions against fellow directors. See
Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980) (applying Virginia law,
the court relied on F/',nn to hold (1) that the business judgment rule is irrelevant to dismissal of
derivative suits and (2) that the special committee cannot dismiss a case of this nature because the
full board has no such power and the committee derives its authority from the board); Maher v.
Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (applying Delaware law, the court relied directly
on the Flynn court's interpretation of Delaware law and refused to grant the special committee
authority to dismiss the action).
63. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d at 1257. The Chancery Court stated:
While the business judgment rule may protect the Committee of Independent Directors
... from personal liability if they have made a good faith decision that this suit is not in
the best interests of [the corporation] and should be dismissed, an analysis of the charac-
ter of a derivative suit shows that the business judgment rule is irrelevant to the question
of whether the Committee has authority to compel dismissal of this suit.
Id
64. Id at 1262.
65. 430 A.2d 779 (Del 1981).
66. Id at 786-87.
67. The court rejected the contention set forth by the Delaware Court of Chancery in Maldo-
nado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1252 (1980), rev'dsub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779 (Del. 1981), that the stockholder retains an independent right to sue derivatively. Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 782-85. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
68. The court contradicted the holding in Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), by holding that disinterested directors cannot rely unilaterally on the business judgment
rule to dismiss derivative suits alleging a breach of fiduciary duty. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d at 787. See note 62 supra and accompanying text; note 76 infra and accompanying text.
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ground that would allow the stockholder to retain the power to bring a
derivative action and yet maintain the board's ability to avoid meritless
litigation.69
The court dismissed the Court of Chancery's contention that the
shareholder has an independent right to maintain a derivative suit
when the cause of action is against the corporate directors.70 Such a
rule, the Delaware Supreme Court explained, would elevate the inter-
ests of one person or group within the corporate structure and ignore
all others.7 '
The court determined that Delaware law72 permits delegation of the
full board's power to an independent committee composed of disinter-
ested directors.73 The majority's interest does not necessarily preclude
an authorization for disinterested directors to act on the board's be-
half.74 The committee may properly move to dismiss derivative suits
upon the determination that continuance of the action is not in the cor-
poration's best interest.75
The court refused to allow the traditional business judgment rule to
serve as a defense to the committee's decision to seek dismissal of a suit
naming fellow directors as defendants. 76 Deferring to the committee's
judgment, the court declared, would ignore the possibility of subcon-
scious bias when directors judge fellow directors.77 The court reasoned
that a greater degree of judicial review is necessary to prevent
impropriety.78
The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the Delaware Court of
Chancery must not blindly defer to the judgment of the special litiga-
tion committee once a derivative suit is properly initiated.79 The court
69. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 787-89.
70. Id at 782-83.
71. Id at 785.
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1975). See note 47 supra.
73. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 785.
74. Id at 786.
75. Id
76. Id at 787.
77. Id
78. Id
79. The court explained that a derivative suit is composed of two "phases," the shareholder's
suit to compel the corporation to sue and the corporation's suit. Id at 784. The first phase con-
cerns the shareholder's method of initiating the suit: by demand that the directors sue, unless such
demand is futile. Id at 783-84. See notes 21-22supra and accompanying text. The Zapata court
treated phase two as the properly initiated suit on the merits. 430 A.2d at 784. Demand was futile
in Zapata, and thus the suit was properly initiated. The threshold issue was whether the board
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invoked a two-step test to determine when a committee's dismissal of a
shareholder's derivative suit is proper."0 First, the lower court must
inquire into the good faith and independence of the committee.8 Sec-
ond, if the court finds the committee to be disinterested, it may proceed
to the next step which requires the court to employ its own business
judgment to ascertain whether the motion to dismiss should be
granted. 82
The Zapata court's refusal to give disinterested directors unbridled
discretion in dismissing derivative suits against directors is laudable.
Applying the business judgment doctrine as a defense to such actions
creates too great a potential for abuse 3 and impinges upon the spirit of
early cases developing the business judgment rule.8 4 Conversely, de-
nial of the shareholder's independent right to bring an action conforms
to the established doctrine that the directors of a corporation determine
whether a party may bring a suit on behalf of the corporation. 5
The Delaware Supreme Court's conclusion that disinterested direc-
tors cannot unilaterally dismiss derivative suits naming fellow directors
as defendants does not contradict the Delaware statutory law authoriz-
ing directors both to manage the coporation 6 and to delegate the full
board's power to a committee.87 The board of directors, of course, can-
not confer upon the committee a power that the board itself does not
had the power to seek dismissal once the suit was properly initiated. Id at 784 n.10. The court
distinguished phase one from phase two, because phase one involves either making demand on
the board or demonstrating an excuse for not making such demand. The court noted that the
traditional business judgment rule is still the appropriate test for phase one. "[When stockhold-
ers, after making demand and having their suit rejected, attack the board's decision as improper,
the board's decision falls under the 'business judgment' rule and will be respected if the require-
ments of the rule are met." Id at 784 n.10 (citing Dent, supra note 16, at 100-01 & nn. 24-25).
The Zapata court's two-step test, see notes 81-83 infra and accompanying text, for determining
whether a board (or special litigation committee) can seek dismissal of a properly initiated suit
applies only to phase two of a derivative suit. Zapata does not affect the validity of the business
judgment rule as applied to phase one determinations involving demand or futility of demand.
80. Id at 788-89.
81. Id
82. Id at 789.
83. See Dent, supra note 16, at 111-13. See generally Note, supra note 17.
84. See United Cooper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Hawes v.
Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881). See also notes 24-33 supra and accompanying text.
85. See United Copper See. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Lewis v.
Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 449 U.S. 869 (1980); notes 18-20 supra.
86. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1980).
87. DE.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1975).
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possess. 88 The United Copper89 line of cases prohibits a board of direc-
tors from dismissing an action if board members are involved in the
suit.90 Using a special committee to terminate such an action repre-
sents an attempt to exercise a right that the board as a full body does
not enjoy.
The court's authorization for the Court of Chancery to exercise its
own business judgment 9' is an extremely large expansion of the judici-
ary's role in such matters. Business judgment consideration as a shield
from attack was traditionally applicable solely to the decisions of cor-
porate management.92 Courts historically have reviewed the integrity
and good faith of management, but they rarely substitute their own
business judgment for that of the board.93 If courts make business de-
cisions in the context of the shareholder derivative suit, they, and not
the board, will decide what is best for a corporation in a variety of
circumstances. 94 Such a broad and far reaching doctrine is perhaps un-
necessary to effectuate the desired end of the Zapata court. A possible
alternative to both the Zapata approach and the traditional business
judgment rule is to shift the burden of proving reasonableness of action
from the shareholder to the board.95
The Delaware Supreme Court in Zapata conceivably overextends ju-
dicial authority by empowering the Court of Chancery to employ its
own business judgment. 96 Zapata nevertheless signifies a determina-
88. See Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713, 716-17 (E.D. Va. 1980). See
generally Stegemoeller, supra note 16.
89. 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
90. See notes 24-27 supra.
91. See note 83 supra.
92. Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713, 717 (E.D. Va. 1980) (dicta). See
notes 17-18 supra.
93. See Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) (court will not intervene if corpo-
rate decision making is uninfluenced by personal considerations and is exercised in good faith).
See note 18 supra See generally Comment, supra note 36, at 391-93.
94. The business judgment doctrine traditionally permits directors to institute actions and
policies that require no justification other than that the judgment is made in good faith for the best
interests of the corporation. See note 16 supra. Although the rationale for permitting directors
broad discretion in deciding matters of corporate policy is well documented and generally ac-
cepted, this rationale does not logically extend to the court's power to review the decision. See
generally Note, supra note 17.
95. See note 51 supra See generally Comment, supra note 36.
96. See notes 91-95 supra and accompanying text.
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tion by the court that the shareholder's derivative suit will remain a
vital check on corporate mismanagement.
JLM.
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